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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

---------00000---------LA

VAR J. COATES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

Case No. 17344

MARY COATES,
Defendant-Respondent.

---------00000---------RESPONDENT 1 S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a divorce case.

Appellant filed a Complaint

against the Respondent seeking, among other things, an
equitable distribution of the marital assets and an Order
requiring each of the parties to bear their o'Wn respective
•attorney's fees.

Respondent answered and counterclaimed

seeking, among 'other things, an award to her of the family
residence; an equitable distribution of the personal property;
and an award to her of attorney's fees.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This case was tried to the Honorable Jay E. Banks, and
after two days of trial, the Trial Court made its Findings
Of Fact and Conclusions of Law and entered a Decree of
Divorce which, in part awarded Respondent the marital
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

residence, subject to a $27,000.00 lien in Appellant's favc:
awarded Respondent alimony from Appellant for a period of
one year; awarded Appellant a 1976 Buick; a residential
duplex building lot, a 2 3 foot Sea Ray boat, trailer and
accessories, a truck and camper, certain i terns of furnitur:./
his tools, his own stock, credit union account and pension
plan and all jewelry in his possession.

Respondent was

awarded the parties' residence on Thunderbird Drive, subjeC'!
I

to the lien noted above, a 1976 Buick, her retirement accoc::,
the jewelry in her possession, and the household furniture
and furnishings in her possession.

The Court further divic;

responsibility between the parties of certain marital obtic:j
ordered Respondent to bear 2/3' s of the 1979 income taxes
and Appellant to bear the remaining 1/3 of such taxes and
awarded Respondent $1,500.00 attorney's fees.
Entry of Decree of Divorce was filed.

A Notice

No objections to th:f
I

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law or Decree of Divorc:j
were made nor was a Motion for New Trial made.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the Trial Court's
Decree of Divorce in all particulars and an award of all
costs incurred by her in connection with this Appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

I

· sio'"
Because Appellant has made certain errors and omis ··1
.
· necessar:
in his Statement of Facts, Respondent feels it is

2
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:/

c::,

to make her own Statement of Facts which more accurately
sets forth facts as found by the Trial Court and as are
supported by the record.
The parties were married on June 26, 1969.

They

experienced marital problems during the marriage (R-235) and
ultimately separated December 1, 1979 (R-225).

Throughout

the 10-year marriage, Appellant worked as an airplane mechanic
for Hughes Airwest.

At the time of the trial, he was

grossing approximately $21,500.00 per year in connection
with his employment (R-320).

Appellant, in addition to

c;

raising the parties' two children, worked throughout the

c:j

marriage (R-243).

For the last 13 of those years, she was

employed by Abbott GM Diesel, first as a bookkeeper and then
in approximately 1973, as Secretary-Treasurer of the corporation
(R-244).

Because of her position with the company from

1973 to 1979, she earned a substantially large salary.
(Defendant's Exhibit 10)

When the company was dissolved

in November of 1979, Respondent was terminated.

From

that date Respondent was unemployed, receiving unemployment
compensation in the amount of $589.10 per month (R-35).

She

was unemployed at the time of trial.
Respondent is an only child (R-391) and her parents
were extremely generous to her both before and during her
marriage.

Her father, a retired airlines worker and janitor

(R-394), testified he purchased for her the home which

3
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I

I

I
He assisted her wit.:'

she brought into the marriage (R-395) .

extensive remodelling of that home (R-396).

After her marri::

to Appellant, he loaned the parties approximately $13,000.0t
for a down payment on the parties' present home.
was subsequently repaid (R-396).

I

This loan

Respondent's father spent .
f

great amounts of time and money remodelling, and repairing '
the present home of the parties (R-398).

In May of 1979,

Respondent's parents made another $6,000.00 loan to the
parties to cover additional remodelling costs on the Thunder:)
Drive home (R-398).

They gave Respondent oil paintings,

clocks, sterling silver and money for the acquisition of
Respondent's jewelry (R-403, 404, 405).

In addition, they

gave Respondent money for furniture placed in the home (R406) .

Respondent's parents were also very generous to the

parties' children and gave them an organ, pool table, down
payments for cars, etc.

(R-402, 409).

They also loaned the

parties $1,500.00 for a down payment on an undeveloped real
estate lot located in Granger (R-400).
The Trial Court found, as fact, that these gifts and
loans had been made

(R-180).

The making of these gifts anc

loans was admitted by Appellant (R-283, 303, 306, 307, 3lli
313, 316).
Also, during the trial, the Trial Court received,
without objection, Defendant's Exhibit 10, which compared
the income of Respondent and Appellant for the years

4
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I

I
I

1969 through 1979.

I
'

That Exhibit showed that during that

period the Appellant earned $188,170.73 while Respondent
earned $236,292.28.

Because of this income disparity,

especially in the last year of the marriage, the Trial
court ordered the Respondent to pay 2/3's of the

1979 Federal and State Income taxes due (R-190, Decree

f

of Divorce) .
Likewise, because of Respondent's unique employment
status, the parties were afforded numerous opportunities to
purchase items of personal property at reduced and discounted
rates - Opportunities solely provided because Respondent
was an officer of a large company.

For example, the truck

and camper were acquired at a discount rate through Respondent's
employer (R-308).

The Buick automobiles were likewise

acquired in the same way at reduced rates (R-309).

The boat

which was brought into the marriage by Appellant was sold to
an employee of Respondent and, this, in turn, allowed the
parties to purchase their Sea Ray Boat (R-310).
There is also no dispute as to the facts that the
Respondent brought a home into the marriage which when sold,
shortly after the marriage, generated $20,500.00 in net
proceeds (R-283).

These funds were used as a portion of the

down payment on the Thunderbird Drive home (R-306).

In

addition, Respondent's father testified that after she lost
her employment, he had assisted her financially in providing

5
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her money to support her and the parties' two children IR·
400).
Both parties presented to the Trial Court documentary
evidence and testimony related to each and every asset whir
was acquired by the parties either before or during, the ·1
marriage and after separation.

The Trial Court was preser.:,.

with appraisals, estimates of values of the assets, andili
sources from which those assets were received or acquired.
Further, at the conclusion of the evidence each party
presented to the Court a summary of assets together with a
1
proposed distribution (Exhibit 44-D and 45-P).

Each of

those exhibits contained not only a list of the assets whi:
were in issue but also an accompanying estimated value of
each such asset.
After receipt of all the evidence, the Court, in that
portion of the Findings of Fact which awarded the Appellan:
a $27,000.00 lien irt the family residence stated:
The amount of this lien has been determined by t'.
Court after the Court's consideration of evidence
presented to the Court by the parties of the value oi
the assets each party brought into the marriage, the
source and value of the assets acquired during the
marriage and all credits and offsets to which ~ach ,
party may be entitled.
(R-181, Paragraph 3, Finding.
of Fact.)
In addition, the Court further made detailed factual
findings as to the property each party brought into the
. red aurinc
marriage (R-180) and the property t h at Was acqul.
the marriage (R-179).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT I
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE TRIAL COURT
PROPERLY AND EQUITABLY DISTRIBUTED
THE MARITAL ASSETS
Appellant contends that the Trial Court inequitably
distributed the marital assets and consequently abused the
wide discretion afforded a Trial Court in making such a
property distribution.

Both the documentary evidence and

the testimony presented to the Trial Court clearly show that
this is just not the case.
In order to prevail, Appellant is required to show that
the Trial Court, in making its distribution of property,
misunderstood or misapplied the law; entered Findings not
supported by the evidence; or caused a serious inequity so
as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah, 1977).
Searlev. Searle, 522 P.2d 697,

English v. English,

As was clearly stated in
(Utah, 1974):

Although it is both the duty and prerogative of
this Court in a case of equity to review the facts as
well as the law, Article VIII, § 9, Constitution of
Utah, the Trial Judge has considerable lattitude of
discretion in adjusting the financial and property
interests in a divorce case.
The actions of the Trial
Court are indulged with the presumption of validity,
and the burden is upon Appellant to prove such a
serious inequity as to manifest a clear abuse of
discretion. (Footnote)
There is no fixed formula for
the division of property; § 30-3-5 U.C.A. 1953, provides that when a decree of divorce is made, the Court
may make such orders in relation to property as may be
equitable.
(Footnote) Id. at 700.
Appellant's burden is not an easy one and the record,
especially the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, does
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not show in any way an abuse of discretion by the Trial
Court.

As was stated in Sorenson v. Sorenson, 3 7 6 p. 2d 54i

(Utah, 1963):

. mani' f est in]
. .
.
Un 1 ess th ere is
ustice
and inequity,,'I
a clear abuse of discretion, the Court will not sub- '·
stitute its Judgment for that of the Trial Court. Id
at 548.

-·I

In making a property distribution, the Trial Court may
consider numerous factors in arriving at an equitable
result.

Among those are such things as the property each

party brought into the marriage; the property acquired
during the marriage and the efforts and contributions of
each party in the acquisition of such property; gifts
during the marriage; and inheritances.

recei~~

Because of the

foregoing, a property division need not be equal, but only
equitable.
1951).
452,

See MacDonald v. MacDonald, 236 P.2d 1066 (Utah,

Such was the case in Tremayne v. Tremayne, 211 P.2d

(Utah, 1949) where the Trial Court awarded the wife

4/5' s of the marital estate and the Supreme Court affirmed
that decision.
Appellant, even though he requested an equitable dis·
tribution in his complaint (R-3) has now attempted in his
Brief to argue that he was entitled an equal distribution.
In this particular case, an egual distribution is not~
equitable distribution and the Trial Court so recognized
this fact.
The figures and values contained in Appellant's Brief
certainly do not deal with and, in fact, omit three impor'.'
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factors considered by the Trial Court Respondent brought into the marriage;

(1) the property

(2) Respondent's

monetary contribution during the last four years of the
marriage; and (3) the gifts, loans and assistance received
from Respondent's parents.
As a preliminary matter, Respondent feels it is necessary
to set the record straight regarding certain claims of
Appellant that the Trial Court did not properly consider the
value of the property it distributed.
by both sides,

Evidence was presented

(documents and testimony) pertaining to the

value of the property in issue (the house; car; boat; truck
and camper; furniture; jewelry; stocks; credit union and
retirements accounts; and the real estate lot)

The Court,

in giving the Appellant a $27,000.00 lien in the parties'
residence (Respondent had asked that he be awarded only a
$13,000.00 lien) specifically stated in the Findings of Fact
and the Decree that:
The amount of this lien has been determined by the
Court after the Court's consideration of evidence
presented to the Court by the parties, of the value of
the assets each party brought into the marriage, the
source and value of assets acquired during the marriage
and all credits and offsets to which each party may be
entitled.
(R-181 and 187-188.)
Little more need be said as to whether the Court considered
the values of the property in dividing the property as it
did.
Turning now to the facts before the Trial Court, it is

9
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not disputed that Respondent brought into the marriage a
home, Appellant did not (R-280, 338).

Respondent's father,
!

expended large amounts of time and money improving that ho:.:
(R-306, 396).

As it should have, the Trial Court awarded/

each party the property he or she brought into the marriage/
I

and because the equity in the home Respondent brought into J
the marriage had been used as a down payment on the Thunde::
I

Drive home, the Trial Court properly gave Respondent
credit for that equity.

Appellant, virtually ignores the::

facts in arguing that he was treated unfairly.
Secondly, Appellant makes little mention of all of th:i
help and assistance given the parties by Respondent's
parents.

The record is also undisputed as to Respondent';.

father's generousi ty towards Respondent, his only child.
As a retired airline worker and maintenance man, he gave
continuous assistance to the parties -

(remodelling of

home Respondent brought into the marriage (R-396); loan
for down payment for Thunderbird property (R-396); loan
for the duplex lot (R-400); work and materials on Thunder:j
property

(R-397); numerous gifts

(R-403-406)).

Even ApoeJ

reluctantly acknowledged these facts in his testimony (R·

"f"'
281-283) and the Trial Court specifically found these~assistance to have been made
Fact).

(R-180; Para. 15, Findings

c'[

Because these gifts and loans were so substantia•'

in size and frequency, the Trial Court rightly took this;
account, in making its property distribution.

10
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The third unique factor presented to the Trial court
was Respondent's very fortunate employment status as secretaryTreasurer of a large company over the last seven years of
the marriage.

During that time Respondent earned an unusually

large salary.

This was demonstrated to the Trial Court by

the income comparison offered as evidence by Respondent
without objection by Appellant (Exhibit 10-D).

A portion of

that Exhibit is set forth below to illustrate the vast
difference in contributions made by the parties over that
period of time.
YEAR

LA VOR COATES

MARY COATES

1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

$11,558.66
12,698.59
16,211.27
18,257.88
18,046.01
19,415.00
23,147.87
24,230.45
20, 000. 00 (approx.)

$ 8,350.53
22,564.20
20,288.93
22,250.00
22,250.00
24,800.00
23,830. 77
30,328.61
49,000.00

TOTALS

$188,170.73

$236,292.28
Exhibit D-10

The Trial Court properly recognized this fact in dividing
responsibility for taxes as it did - Respondent 2/3's,
Appellant 1/3.
In addition, through her employment, Respondent was
able to provide the parties with unique purchasing opportunities
allowing the parties to acquire property at reduced and
substantially discounted prices (R-308, 309, 310) - another
fact Appellant conveniently overlooks in his Brief.
Finally, in spite of a specific finding to the contrary,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellant claims the Trial Court did not consider the vaJ,,:

.. ,
I

of the parties' furniture, stocks and jewelry.

This is kl
I

not true, inasmuch as Appellant himself presented an exhib.
listing all of what he claimed to be the personal propert:
in issue (Exhibits 32-P and 37-P) and the values attribut~.
to the same.

The testimony of both of the parties and
I

Respondent's father established that much of the property·:·j
those lists was:

(1) the property of the children -

(The Trial Court ordered that that property remain with tt::
children (R-191)); and (2) property given to Respondent by!
father near the time of separation (R-406).

Further the I

testimony revealed that Appellant had, just subsequent to
separation, been given the opportunity to select what
furniture and personal property he wished to retain (R-291
342) and he did take various items when he vacated the
residence (R-342).
Likewise, each party was given their own jewelry
182, 183).

(R·,

Appellant also fails to mention the fact that

Respondent's jewelry was acquired by cash given her by her
father for the specific purpose of purchasing this jewelry
(R-405).
The stock which Appellant claims the Court did not
consider was liquidated and used by Respondent for two

I

i

purposes - a graduation gift for her son (R-336) and payrrt·J
for improvement on the home ( R- 3 41) .

In addition, duriM

the course of the parties' separation, the stoc k
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h d a)rei:

a

1

been divided equally between the parties (R-352, 383).
Finally, Appellant's argument regarding marital
misconduct is simply a ~ sequitur.

He first cites authority

standing for the proposition that a court should not "punish
a party for marital misconduct and then infers that the Trial
court should have punished Respondent (Appellant's Brief, Page
10).

This is yet but another attempt to "second guess" the

Trial Court and secure a result which is more to Appellant's
liking.
The Trial Court, throughout the trial, was conscientious
and thorough in reviewing the evidence and Appellant has
failed to demonstrate any abuse of discretion whatsoever in
relation to its property distribution.
POINT II
THE ATTORNEY' FEES AWARDED BY THE TRIAL
COURT WERE REASONABLE AND NEEDED BY THE RESPONDENT
In a divorce action, the Trial Court may in its discretion,
award either party such sums as will "enable such party to
prosecute or defend the action."
(1953).

§

30-3-3, Utah Code Ann.

As in the case of a property distribution and a

support award, the Trial Court is also vested with wide
discretion when making an award of attorney's fees.
It would lead to intolerable instability of judgments
if this Court should assume the prerogative and accept
the responsibility of merely second guessing a trial
judge who has done a conscientious job of attempting
to make a just and equitable allocation of property and
income of the parties in regard to alimony and support
money, as the trial judge appears to have done here.
It is due to this fact, taken into consideration with
the nature of the trial judge's authority and duty, and
his advantage position that in such matters he is
allowed a comparatively wide latitude of discretion
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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which will. not be disturbed
in the absence of a cl ea• I
.
a b use a circumstance which we have not found here ·1
.<ci~atic;ins).This is a~so true of attorney's fees~hic·
it is likewise the Trial Court's prerogative to fi ·
(Citation) Bader v. Bader, 424 P.2d 150, 151 (Utahx.
1967)
I
I
Such an award must rest on evidence of need and reasonabl·
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah, 1980).

There is ample

evidence of both in the record in this case.
At the time of trial, Respondent was unemployed and 1,
receiving only $589 .19 per month unemployment compensation
(R-334).

Her monthly expenses and the maintenance of the

home, herself and her children far exceeded her income
(Exhibit 12 and R-334).

Her father had been helping to

maintain her during the action (R-350, 400).

The Court's

property distribution gave her no ready cash and no income·
producing assets
of Law)

(R-177-185, Findings of Fact and Conclusi

This evidence more than amply supported the conc11

that Respondent needed assistance to pay her attorney's
fees.
The Trial Court's award of fees was also more than
reasonable.

Respondent's counsel requested an award of

$3,300.00 (R-411) and supported that request with acomput'
printout of time and costs expended on Respondent's behalf
(Exhibit
214).

isl.

No objection was made to this Exhibit (R·

Likewise, Respondent's counsel testified that in hi:

opinion the fees requested were reasonable (R-411) ·
no objection was interposed to that testimony nor

14
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Also,

did Appe

I

counsel even elect to cross-examine Respondent's attorney
(R-411) •

After receiving that evidence, the Trial Court in
accord with its broad discretion felt that Appellant should
contribute $1,500.00 to Respondent's attorney's fees - a sum
less than half the amount requested by Respondent.

Clearly

both criteria pertaining to awards of attorney's fees were
satisfied and there was no abuse of discretion in making
this attorney's fees award.
CONCLUSION
There is no basis in fact or law to alter the decision
of the Trial Cou;;t.

The property distribution was fair and

equitable given the contributions made by each party to
acquire those assets and the sources of those assets.

The

Trial Court in its wisdom after being presented with more
than ample-evidence, ordered a division of the property
which was equitable.

That was exactly the result which

Appellant requested in his initial Complaint.

Appellant has

shown no abuse of discretion in connection with the property
distribution.
Likewise, the Trial Court's award of attorney's fees
was certainly appropriate given Respondent's need and income,
and the reasonableness of the fees requested.
Respondent respectfully requests this Court to affirm
the Decree of Divorce in this matter in all particulars and
to award Respondent her costs incurred in connection with
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this Appeal.
Respectfully submitted this

J..~t/: day

GUSTIN I ADAMS I

KASTING

of April, l9il,
&

LIAPIS

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of
the foregoing RESPONDENT Is BRIEF were placed with "The
Runner Service" to be delivered to Walter R. Ellett, Esq,,
5085 South State, Murray, Utah, 84107, this ~yo!
April, 1981.
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